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    Firms with agency problems are more vulnerable to litigation, i.e. they are more likely to be 
sued. The U.S. securities laws allow shareholders to file a lawsuit against a firm when they feel 
that their investment in firm was misappropriated or misproperly managed by the firm’s executives. 
This paper examines the link between shareholder litigation and various corporate governance 
practices. Focusing on seasoned firms, we employ a sample of 1613 sued firms and a matching 
sample of 1613 non-sued firms. We find that poor corporate governance mechanism, shorter CEO 
tenure, lower CEO salary, and lower incentive pay in the form of restricted shares increases the 
probability of litigation, holding constant a wide range of control variables. We further document 
that sued firms improve their governance practices after a lawsuit by increasing the proportion of 
outside members on the board and dissolving the CEO-chairmanship link. These findings support 
the view that corporate governance has an impact on litigation risk, and that litigation leads to 
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A growing body of empirical research examines the relation between shareholder litigation 
activities and the manager-shareholder agency problem. In addition, several studies suggest that 
shareholder class actions serve as an external ex-post monitoring mechanism and that the 
underlying reason for such lawsuits are governance problems that lead to management fraud or 
other suable misconduct. 
Strahan (1998) concludes that firms prone to agency problems are more likely to face securities 
class action lawsuits. Core (2000) finds that directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums are higher 
for firms with weaker governance and that premiums are positively associated with the probability 
of litigation risk. Denis et al. (2006) note that the likelihood of fraud allegations is negatively related 
to bonus payments. They also report a positive association between measures of option intensity 
and class action lawsuits for securities fraud. Gillian (2006) concludes that law, regulation and 
lawsuits serve as an important mechanism of external governance. In addition, Ferris et al. (2007) 
study derivative lawsuits and find that the incidence of lawsuits is higher for firms with greater 
agency problems. They further show that the proportion of outside representation increases, board 
size decreases, and fewer CEOs continue to hold a dual position of chairman following lawsuits. 
Peng and Röell (2008) find a significant relationship between option-based executive 
compensation and litigation: ex ante incentive pay in the form of options significantly increases 
the probability of a shareholder class action lawsuit. 
However, little work examines the relation between shareholder litigation activity and the entire 
corporate governance system within the firm. Our study adds to the literature with a wider set of 
corporate governance and compensation variables and an extension of the sample period. 
We study two main hypotheses to understand the interaction between litigation risk and corporate 
governance. The first main hypothesis is that firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms 
are more likely to be sued. In terms of corporate governance mechanisms, we examine both an 
integrated corporate governance index, as well as board structure, ownership structure, CEO 
characteristics and compensation. The second main hypothesis is that firms that face litigation are 
more likely to improve their corporate governance. 
Our sued sample is based on information provided by Stanford’s Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse and consists of 1,613 non-IPO suits between January 1996 and December 2012. 
Using a propensity matching approach, we create a full sample by matching each sued firm with 
a non-sued firm in the same industry. Our data are obtained from various sources: we collect 
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governance, board, and director variables from Risk Metrics, compensation variables from 
Execucomp, institutional holdings from Thomson Financial’s 13f filings, analyst forecasts from 
I/B/E/S, and firm and stock characteristics from the Center for Research in Security Prices and 
Compustat. 
We conduct several tests to explore our hypotheses. We first report univariate comparisons of 
corporate governance mechanisms between our sued and non-sued sample, and estimate logit 
models that include other possible determinants of litigation risk and other corporate governance 
factors. We then investigate if firms with flaws in their governance structure improve their 
governance one year and two years after the occurrence of a lawsuit, respectively. Lastly, we 
perform a multivariate analysis to test if it is the lawsuit that drives the governance changes. 
Our results confirm that firms with poor corporate governance are more likely to be sued, as 
indicated by a positive association between the G-Index and the incidence of lawsuits at the 5% 
level of significance. Furthermore, we provide evidence that salary, LTIPs and restricted shares 
are important predictors of litigation. Firms are more likely to be sued when salaries represent a 
lower percentage of total compensation or when long term incentive plans or restricted shares 
represent a higher proportion of a CEO’s compensation package. Furthermore, the impact of CEO 
tenure on the probability of litigation is significantly negative at the 5% level, indicating that CEOs 
who have shorter tenure may be more innovative and risky in their business practices, which could 
increase their litigation risk. Our results also weakly suggest that firms with older CEO are more 
likely to be sued before the financial crisis in 2007. With respect to our second hypothesis, sued 
firms increase the proportion of outside board members one year after the lawsuit, and keep 
increasing the proportion two years afterwards. In addition, sued firms dissolve the CEO-
chairmanship link two years after the lawsuit. However, we find little support for the notion that 
litigation risk on governance changes. Our findings imply that changes in corporate governance 
do result from higher litigation risks. 
Relative to the literature on the determinants of securities litigation, what is new and different about 
our work is that we provide an overview about this issue with a broader set of variables and with 
an up-to-date sample. Existing studies have focused on the impact of a specific aspect of 
corporate governance and company characteristics. We include these variables as controls but 
add more governance related variables. In addition, existing work mostly uses litigation data 
before 2008. We contribute by updating the sample to the end of 2012. 
3 
 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant empirical research and outlines 
the hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection process. 
Section 4 presents the variable measures and research design. Section 5 exhibits the empirical 
analysis and results: Section 5.1 examines logit regressions to test hypothesis 1, Section 5.2 
investigates the effect of litigation on the corporate governance changes. Section 6 discusses the 
limitations of our study and presents a robustness test. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses and Literature Review 
 
Our study is based on the premise that firms with agency problems are more vulnerable to 
litigation, i.e. that these firms are more likely to be sued. The U.S. securities laws allow 
shareholders to file a lawsuit against a firm when they feel that their investment in a firm was 
misappropriated or misproperly managed by the firm’s management. In this section, we review 
the growing body of literature that examines the incentives for and effects of a lawsuit. 
Strahan (1998) observes that firms prone to agency problems are more likely to face securities 
class action lawsuits. Bhagat et al. (1998) discover that no matter whether it is a government 
entity, another firm, or a private citizen who bring a lawsuit against a firm, defendant shareholders 
experience economically meaningful and statistically significant wealth losses upon the filing of 
the suit. Moreover, Core (2000) finds that directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums are higher 
for firms with weaker governance, and that premiums are positively associated with the probability 
of litigation. In addition, Lu (2003) states that over the period 1988–2000, firms with higher litigation 
risk tend to engage more in income-increasing earnings manipulation, whereas income-increasing 
earnings manipulation does not necessarily increase firms’ litigation risk. DuCharme et al. (2004) 
study 150 IPO firms and 72 SEO firms from 1988 to 1997 and conclude that abnormal accounting 
accruals have a significant positive relation with subsequent litigation against SEO firms. 
Altogether, it has been widely recognized that the legal protection of shareholders’ rights is an 
essential element of corporate governance. 
This paper draws upon and links a number of threads in the corporate governance and litigation 
literature in order to analyze the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms on 
corporate litigation risk. 




Hypothesis 1: Firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be sued. 
To test this hypothesis, we will first consider a broad corporate governance index and then explore 
how specific board characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics and compensation 
affect a firm’s litigation risk. 
Gompers et al. (2003) build an integrated governance index as a proxy for the balance of power 
between managers and shareholders in a given firm. The G-Index captures shareholder rights at 
different levels and represents strong shareholder rights and weak management power when the 
index is small. Fich and Shivdasanwe (2007) show that the G-Index is significantly higher for sued 
firms, suggesting a weaker governance structure for these firms. A high governance index 
significantly increases the probability of a fraud lawsuit1. Although there is no direct evidence on 
the relation between shareholder litigation and the G-Index, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Firms with a high corporate governance index are more likely to be sued. 
Larger boards have been shown to be ineffective compared to smaller boards (Jensen, 1993, and 
Beasley, 1996). Fich and Shivdasanwe (2007) point out that boards of sued firms tend to be larger 
than those of non-sued firms by almost one director and sued firms tend to have fewer 
independent outside directors. According to Weisbach (1988), Dechow et al. (1996) and Karpoff 
et al. (1996), more independent boards, larger audit committees, and greater institutional 
ownership infer stronger corporate governance. In this context, Beasley (1996) finds that if firms 
have a higher proportion of outside directors, financial statement fraud is less likely. 
Although there is no previous study that examines the relation between shareholder litigation and 
the size and composition of a firm’s audit committee as well as CEO/chairman duality, researchers 
have studied how these aspects of corporate governance affect corporate fraud. Uzun et al. (2004) 
conclude that corporate fraud is much less likely for firms that have a high percentage of 
independent outside directors on the board and audit committee. They argue that outside directors 
have fewer incentives to commit fraud. Therefore, the more outsiders serve on the board, the more 
likely they can prevent or reduce the fraudulent behaviour of the executive directors. Similarly, we 
expect litigation risk to be higher for firms with larger audit committee and more outside directors 
on the committee. CEO/chairman duality is another indicator of board independence. Dechow et 
al. (1996) argue that fraud is more likely in firms in which the chairman is also the CEO and that 
                                                          
1 Their variable of interest, sued, is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is sued for allegedly violating rule 
10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Our subjects here are all lawsuits on Stanford Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu/), rather than a specific type of lawsuits. 
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have fewer outsiders on the board, although Beasley (1996) and Uzun et al. (2004) find that the 
duality of the CEO and chairman positions does not affect fraud. Therefore, we expect litigation 
risk to be higher for firms in which the CEO is also the board chairman.  
Hypothesis 1.2: Firms with larger and less independent boards and audit committees are more 
likely to be sued. 
Mohan (2004) argues that closer monitoring by shareholders can effectively prevent litigation. 
Because it is difficult for small private shareholder to monitor, institutional investors play an 
important role in monitoring. One of his main findings is that firms with large institutional 
blockholders are less likely to be sued. 
Barker and Mueller (2002) observe that the value of CEO stock holdings is positively related to 
R&D spending. This finding is consistent with agency theory and suggests that CEOs make 
longer-term investments that maximize firm value when their interests are closely aligned with 
those of the firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Cho, 1998). Wang (2004) reports 
a negative association between the probability of fraud litigation and investment expenditures, 
particularly R&D expenditures.  Given these findings, we expect litigation risk to be higher for firms 
with lower CEO ownership, because the CEO’s interests are not properly aligned with shareholder 
interests. 
Hypothesis 1.3: Firms with lower institutional ownership and CEO ownership are more likely to be 
sued. 
Empirical studies have found that older top managers tend to pursue lower-growth strategies 
(Child, 1974), and tend to be more risk averse (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990). Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) note that older executives tend to be more conservative. Although Nelson (2005) 
finds no relationship between CEO age, tenure, or compensation and governance changes, we 
expect the likelihood of lawsuits to be lower for firms in which CEOs are older, because they 
usually follow a more conservative business strategy and would not risk their pensions and/or 
stock option plans with decisions that would harm the firm and its shareholders. 
Powell and Ansic (1997) show that females are more risk-adverse when making financial 
decisions than males. Women have been shown to be more conservative investors because they 
invest a smaller proportion of their wealth in risky assets compared to men (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 1998, and Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001). Martin et al. (2009) find that female CEOs are 
more likely selected to reduce the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Faccio et al. (2012) demonstrate 
that female CEOs have a lower risk preference in investment and financing opportunities. 
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Altogether, there is a clear pattern that the level of risk aversion is higher among female than 
among male CEOs and that litigation risk may be lower for firms in which the CEO is female. 
Miller (1991) asserts that CEOs with longer tenure may not keep themselves updated with 
changes in organizational environments and therefore may be less likely to make changes that 
keep the firm evolving over time. Grimm and Smith (1991) find that CEOs make fewer strategic 
changes as their tenure increases. This lack of change occurs because as tenure increases, CEOs 
became more dedicated to implementing their own model for operating the business (Hambrick 
and Fukutomi, 1991). Beasley (1996) states that the tenure of the company chairman or CEO may 
have an impact on corporate fraud. Barker and Mueller (2002) find evidence that suggests that 
relative R&D spending increases with longer CEO tenure. Overall, with longer tenure, CEOs are 
more conservative in their business strategy, reducing the probability of lawsuits. Hence, we 
expect litigation risk to decrease as CEO tenure increases. 
Hypothesis 1.4: Firms with a younger male CEO who has shorter tenure are more likely to be 
sued. 
Since Murphy’s (1999) seminal paper, it has been widely accepted that there are three major 
components to CEO compensation, namely basic salaries, annual bonus plans, and stock options. 
A CEO’s basic salary, just as its name implies, acts as a base compensation and is usually a fixed 
amount in the executive’s remuneration contract. The annual bonus plan is a performance-based 
reward for the CEO, with benchmarks that are typically based on pre-established financial and/or 
non-financial performance objectives. A stock option is in essence a vesting right for the CEO to 
purchase a certain amount of shares at a pre-determined exercise price. 
Because the basic salary represents a fixed compensation component that is pre-determined and 
known to the CEO, a risk-averse CEO will prefer an increase in his/her basic salary which comes 
with a higher level of certainty to an increase in bonus plans or stock options which come with a 
higher level of uncertainty. Therefore, it is natural to infer that if basic salary is a dominant part of 
a CEO’s compensation package, the CEO tends to pursue conservative projects out of his/her 
preference for certainty and aversion to risk. 
Denis et al. (2006) note that the likelihood of fraud allegations is negatively related to bonus 
payments. They also report a positive association between measures of option intensity and fraud-
related class action lawsuits. The size of annual bonus plans is mainly determined on the basis of 
company’s financial or non-financial performance during the current year. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that if the CEO’s compensation is comprised of a considerable amount 
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of bonus payments, the CEO would be inclined to carry out a less risky business strategy, which 
will not undermine the shareholder’s wealth.  
More recently, Peng and Röell (2008) find that there is a significant relationship between option-
based executive compensation and litigation: ex ante incentive pay in the form of options 
significantly increases the probability of a shareholder class action lawsuit. Similarly, Jones and 
Wu (2009) show that the extent of option-based executive compensation is positively related to 
lawsuit incidence. Therefore, it is likely that if the stock options constitute the major or even the 
greatest part of a CEO’s total compensation, the CEO has higher incentives to engage in riskier 
business practices, which in turn might increase the probability of being sued.  
There are few papers that examine long term incentive plans and restricted shares. Both of them 
can only be rewarded when the CEO fulfills various conditions and requirements, such as an 
increase in earnings per share or the achievement of other financial targets. If long term incentive 
plans or restricted shares dominate the compensation package, the CEO may pursue an 
aggressive operating, investment and financial strategy to achieve those goals and thereby reap 
the benefits of LTIPs and restricted shares. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that if LTIPs or 
restricted shares account for a major portion of the CEO’s compensation package, the litigation 
risk for the firm will be higher. To sum up, we formulate the following hypothesis about CEO 
compensation: 
Hypothesis 1.5: Firms are more likely to be sued when salary and bonus make up a small 
proportion of a CEO’s compensation package, and when options, long term incentive plans and/or 
restricted shares account for a large part of the CEO’s compensation package. 
A number of studies have identified factors that are associated with litigation. According to prior 
academic research, it is necessary to control for the influence of several factors on litigation risk. 
For instance, Peng and Röell (2008) show that stock turnover, stock price volatility, firm size, 
return on assets, financial leverage, intangible assets, the book to market ratio, and dividends 
have an influence on the incidence of shareholder lawsuits. In addition to the factors above, 
Krishnan and Lee (2009) include buy and hold returns in their litigation risk model. Wang (2004) 
reports that the probability of fraud litigation is negatively related to investment expenditures, 
especially R&D expenditures. Mohan (2004) argues that companies which are followed by more 
analysts should benefit from closer monitoring, as these analysts collect and disseminate 
information to shareholders.  
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There has been evidence of corporate governance changes around certain lawsuits. Jones and 
Weingram (1996), Strahan (1998), Agrawal et al. (1999), and Niehaus and Roth (1999) study CEO 
turnover around fraud-related lawsuit filings. Farber (2005) indicates that firms charged with fraud 
by the SEC tend to have poor governance compared to a control group, and that the average 
governance of the fraud firms improves during the following three years. Ferris et al. (2007) study 
derivative lawsuits and find that the incidence of lawsuits is higher for firms with greater agency 
problems. They further show that the proportion of outside representation increases, board size 
decreases, and fewer CEOs continue to serve in a dual CEO/chairman position. Fich and 
Shivdasanwe (2007) argue that boards of sued firms are more likely to have outside directors with 
reputations for monitoring and fraud detection. If the firm detects a signal that a firm is more prone 
to litigation than expected, the number of board seats held by outside directors will be adjusted 
endogenously. Together, these studies suggest that corporate governance improves following a 
lawsuit. Therefore, our second main hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have higher litigation risk are more likely to improve their corporate 
governance. 
To the best our knowledge, this is a first paper to comprehensively examine the interrelation 
between corporate governance and litigation risk. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Data Description 
 
Our litigation sample is based on information provided by Stanford University’s Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu/) and consists of 3,562 lawsuits between 
January 1996 and December 2012. For each case, we collect the lawsuit filing date, company 
identifiers, and the case summary. To measure the litigation environment, we calculate yearly 
litigation frequencies. We exclude 788 financial firms with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999. In 
addition, we limit our sample to lawsuits against seasoned firms. To detect IPO-related cases, we 
search for the words “Prospectus”, “1933”, “initial”, “offering”, “underwriter”, “and “IPO” in the case 
summary.  
If the case is indeed related to misstatements in the firm’s IPO prospectus, we exclude it from our 
sample. After excluding all IPO-related cases, our sample consists of 2,024 firms. 
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Finally, because we need information on stock prices from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), we also delete lawsuits against privately held firms. The resulting data set thus 
includes 2,019 sued cases. 
We match each sample firm with a control firm that is not subject to a class action lawsuit using a 
propensity score matching approach. Specifically, we first merge Risk Metrics and Compustat, 
and then identify all firms in this merged database having the same four-digit SIC code as the 
sued firm. Then, each sued firm is matched to a non-sued firm by minimizing the Euclidean 








where d is the Euclidean distance between the sued firm s and the non-sued firm n, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 and 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 are the logarithms of the firm’s total assets, 𝐵𝑀𝑠 and 𝐵𝑀𝑛 are the book to market ratios, and 
𝜎𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑠
2  and  𝜎𝐵𝑀,𝑠
2  are the variances of the size and book to market ratio, respectively, of the sued 
firms and non-sued firms. All variables in this matching procedure are calculated using data one 
year prior to the filing date. After matching each sued firm to a non-sued firm by industry, size, and 
book-to market ratio, we obtain a sample of 1,613 matching firm pairs (i.e., 3,226 firms in total). 
Table 1 provides an overview of our litigation sample. In the second column, we list the total 
number of lawsuits based on information provided by Stanford’s Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse. Column 3 provides information on the final composition of our sample after the 
aforementioned exclusions and matching criteria. 
 
****************************Insert Table 1 here**************************** 
 
The variables used in this study are broadly categorized as the governance index, as well as 
board, ownership, CEO, compensation and control variables. We collect these data from various 
databases on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Data on the majority of the independent 
variables, including the G-Index (Gompers et al., 2003), the size of the board and the audit 
committee, the percentage of outsiders on the board and the audit committee, a CEO/chairman 
duality dummy, CEO gender, CEO age, and CEO tenure, are obtained from Risk Metrics, which 
reports corporate governance provisions adopted by large public firms. The database covers most 
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high market value firms in the U.S. market. Risk Metrics data are gathered from SEC filings by 
firms such as 10-K and 10-Q filings, annual reports, and other public sources. The Risk Metrics 
database consists of two parts each related to a specific time period: before 2007, IRRC was 
initially the data provider and collected all the variables needed to build the governance index; 
beginning in 2007, the acquisition of IRRC and ISS changed the methodology used to collect the 
data. Also, the new method does not collect all the variables needed to create the governance 
index. In Risk Metrics, the sub-database before 2007 is called Legacy, and the sub-database after 
2007 is called Governance/Directors. The size of the board and audit committee, the outsider 
percentage on the board and audit committee, and CEO/chairman duality can be calculated with 
information on Risk Metrics. Institutional investor holdings are obtained from 13F filings through 
Thomson Financial, which provides consolidated stock holdings for all institutional managers filing 
13F reports with the SEC. CEO stock ownership and the CEO compensation variables including 
salary, bonuses, options, long term incentive plans and restricted shares, are constructed using 
the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database. 
To control for other economic factors that are not captured by governance variables but that may 
be related to the probability of litigation, we compute a set of firm-level variables using data 
obtained from Compustat. We further supplement the data with daily share volume, common 
shares outstanding and daily stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and compute stock turnover, stock price volatility, and buy-and-hold returns, which have been 
demonstrated to have an impact on probability of shareholder litigation. Data on analyst coverage, 
measured as the number of analyst recommendations, is retrieved from I/B/E/S on Thomson 
Financial’s database. Unless otherwise stated, all variables are measured using year-end data 
from one year prior to the filing date of a given lawsuit. 
****************************Insert Table 2 here**************************** 
Table 2 reports information on the G-index, board structure, ownership structure, CEO 
characteristics, compensation characteristics and control variables for the sued and non-sued 
firms. We report means and medians and conduct T-tests and Wilcoxon tests to determine if there 
are significant differences in the means and medians between the two sets of firms.  All variables 
are measured one year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
We observe that there are significant differences in these variables between sued firms and non-
sued firms. The G-Index is significantly higher for sued firms, suggesting a weaker governance 
structure for these firms. Whereas Gompers et al. (2003) use 24 provisions to calculate the G-
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Index, the Risk Metrics-Governance database only provides data for 12 provisions. To ensure 
consistency, we only use the 12 provisions that are consistently available in both the Legacy 
database (data from 1995 to 2006) and the Governance database (from 2007 to 2013) to compute 
the index. 
In addition, boards of sued firms tend to be larger than those of non-sued firms by almost two 
directors. We observe a larger audit committee in sued firms, even if the difference between the 
two samples is small. The percentages of outsiders on the board and audit committee, however, 
are significantly higher for sued firms than for non-sued firms, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1.2. 
Sued firms are more likely to have a combined CEO-chairman leadership structure than non-sued 
firms.  
In terms of ownership structure, institutional ownership and CEO ownership are significantly lower 
in sued firms, indicating that institutional shareholders do not have enough monitoring power and 
that interests of CEO may not be aligned with those of the firm’s shareholders. The average 
change in the institutional holding from one year before the lawsuit to the filing date is similar for 
sued and non-sued firms, whereas the median change is significantly larger (at the 1% level) for 
sued firms. 
In line with our prediction in Hypothesis 1.4, sued firms are also more likely to have a younger 
CEO with shorter tenure. One exception is the female dummy, which is calculated as the number 
of female CEOs over the total number of CEOs if multiple CEOs exists in the firm. The median 
fraction of female CEOs is significantly greater at the 1% level for sued firms than for non-sued 
firms, although the mean difference is only significant at the 5% level. 
Our results also show that the components of executive compensation between sued and non-
sued firms are all significantly different at the 1% level or lower. However, although we expected 
the proportion of bonuses to be lower for sued firms, the results turn out to be opposite. 
Most control variables differ significantly between sued and non-sued firms. The mean for 
dividends is slightly higher for sued firms than for non-sued firms, but the difference is not 
significant. 
To summarize, these comparisons highlight differences that may exist between sued firms and 







In this paper, we examine whether firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms are more 
likely to be sued. Our basic estimation model is specified as follows: 
𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖) 
where: 
𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖 = Dummy variable that identifies whether or not a firm is sued in a securities class action 
lawsuit (1=yes, 0=no)  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = A set of variables that measure a firm’s corporate governance, 
including a governance index, the proportion of outside members on the board, institutional 
holdings, CEO tenure, CEO/chairman duality, etc. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖  = A set of variables that are associated with litigation, including firm size, 
turnover, stock price volatility, buy-and-hold return, ROA, book-to-market ratio, leverage ratio, 
dividend ratio, litigation frequency, industry effects, and analyst coverage. 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct one of the first governance indices. The aim of creating the index 
is to have a sense of how much a firm restricts its shareholder rights via rules and provisions in 
the bylaws of the firm. The G-Index takes on values between 1 and 24 based on provisions that 
Risk Metrics-Legacy provides in its governance database. In our sample, G varies between 1 and 
11 with a mean of 5.529. Since Risk Metrics-Governance only provides data for 12 provisions after 
2007, we only consider the 12 provisions that are available in both the Legacy database (data 
from 1995 to 2006) and the Governance database (data from 2007 to 2013) to compute the index. 
This ensures a consistent approach throughout our sample period. Specifically, we evaluate the 
presence of twelve provisions including Blank Check, Bylaw, Charter, Classified Board (also called 
Staggered Board), Cumulative Voting, Fair Price, Golden Parachute, Poison Pill, Secret Ballots 
(also called Confidential Voting), Special Meeting, Supermajority and Written Consent (see 
Gompers et al. (2003) for more details. For each provision that restricts shareholder rights, we 
add one point to the firm’s G-Index. Cumulative Voting and Secret Ballot are the only two 
provisions whose presence is explained as an increase in shareholder rights. Therefore, whenever 
either of these two provisions are present, we subtract one point from the firm’s G-Index.  
As noted above, the new data gathering procedures employed by Risk Metrics require that we 
perform our own calculations. Some dummy variables, such as Supermajority, were changed to 
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actual percentages. In this paper, we count one point for Supermajority if this percentage is above 
66.7%. Another issue we faced during our data gathering process was a lack of data for some 
years (data are reported for years 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006). To address this 
problem, we replace missing values with the previous year’s values. This procedure is used by 
Gompers et al. (2003). 
We measure board size as the number of directors on the board and board independence as the 
percentage of outside independent directors on the board. Audit committee size and audit 
committee independence are defined similarly. In order to capture firms in which the CEO holds a 
dual appointment as chairman, we also collect information on the employee title of the director. 
The duality dummy is coded as 1 when the chairman of the board of directors simultaneously 
holds the title of CEO or president. 
We calculate the proportion of shares outstanding held by all institutional owners as: 




where N is the number of institutional managers reporting their positions on form 13F, 𝑠𝑖 is the 
number of shares owned by institutional manager i, and S is the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
Following Barber et al. (1996) and Barabanov et al. (2013), we consider changes in institutional 
ownership in both a univariate and multivariate analysis and measure changes in ownership from 
period T-i we to T-j as the natural logarithm of (ownership at T-j)/(ownership at T-i). Similarly, CEO 
ownership is computed as the ratio of the total shares held by the CEO to the total number of 
common shares outstanding. 
Our analysis of CEO compensation is based on five different components of compensation: salary, 
bonus, options, long term incentive programs (LTIPs), and restricted shares. In this paper, we 
measure the relative weights of these components by dividing the dollar amount of each 
compensation component by the CEO’s total compensation, i.e. the basic salary, bonus, options, 
LTIPs, and restricted shares. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm one year prior to 
the lawsuit. Turnover is defined as the average daily trading volume as a percentage of the number 
of shares outstanding for the fiscal year. Volatility, as a proxy for risk, is measured as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns annualized assuming 252 trading days per year. Because lawsuits 
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are typically filed after a sharp price decline, we also control for the buy and hold return, which is 
measured as the holding period return during a period of 252 trading days before the lawsuit filing. 
Furthermore, we consider a series of variables related to agency problems within the firm, 
including the book-to-market ratio (BM), ROA, intangible assets, leverage, and dividends. BM is 
the ratio of book value of equity to the firm’s market capitalization. ROA is computed using 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by the firm’s total assets at the end of the previous 
year. Intangible assets are measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s intangible assets. To 
examine the impact of leverage and dividends on a firm’s litigation risk, we compute leverage as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets and dividends as the ratio of total dividends over earnings 
before interests and taxes.. Analyst coverage is measured as the total number of analyst forecasts 
for the firm during the one year period before the lawsuit. To proxy for the litigation environment 
in a given year, we measure litigation frequency as the total number of lawsuits that took place 
one year before the filing date.  To examine industry effects, we classify firms as technology (tech) 
firms and non-tech firms. Following Barabanov et al. (2013), we consider a firm as a tech firm if 
its SIC code falls into one of the following categories: 2833-2836, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 
3661, 3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825-3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370-
7375, or 7377-7379. 
To ensure that our regression results are unaffected by any potential multicollinearity, we examine 
the correlations between all variables used in this study. Table 3 lists the independent and control 
variables used in the study along with the pairwise correlations2. As expected, audit committee 
size is highly correlated with board size with a coefficient of 0.81. Similarly, the percentage of 
outsiders on the board and on the audit committee are strongly correlated with a coefficient of 
0.64. Furthermore, CEO ownership is strongly correlated with CEO tenure with a coefficient of 
0.59; likely because as the CEO tenure increases, the CEO may be given more shares as 
compensation or as an incentive. Finally, it is worth noting that salary, bonuses, and options are 
significantly correlated at the 99% confidence level: salary is correlated with bonus with a 
coefficient of 0.60, and with option with a coefficient of 0.74; bonuses and options are correlated 
with a coefficient of 0.54. As reported, some of the control variables are also significantly 
correlated to compensation variables. Salary is strongly correlated with size with a coefficient of 
0.85, with intangible assets with a coefficient of 0.79, and with analyst coverage with a coefficient 
of 0.7. Bonuses and intangible assets are correlated with a coefficient of 0.58. Options are strongly 
correlated with intangible assets with a coefficient of 0.70, and with analyst coverage with a 
                                                          
2 For expositional convenience, we only report the correlation coefficients for highly correlated variables in Table 3. 
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coefficient of 0.80. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we estimate different constellations of our 
variables and avoid including highly correlated variables in the same model 
 
****************************Insert Table 3 here**************************** 
The second problem we study is whether litigation leads to corporate governance changes. 
Specifically, do firms with flaws in their governance structure improve their governance after the 
occurrence of a lawsuit? 
To test the hypothesis, we conduct a univariate test to examine if there are any changes in a firm’s 
governance structure from one year before a lawsuit (T-1) to one year (T+1) and two years (T+2) 
after the lawsuit. Furthermore, we employ a series of multivariate tests to examine whether 
changes in corporate governance are due to lawsuits or other factors. Specifically, we employ a 
broad corporate governance index and test whether the index value changes after a lawsuit. In 
addition, we explore whether sued firms change specific aspects of their governance structure. 
For instance, after a lawsuit, does a firm decrease its board size, increase the proportion of outside 
board members, or implement a new board structure in which the CEO position is separated from 
the position of chairman of the board? We answer these questions with the following models: 
∆ 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖) 
where 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = Governance index, board size, percentage of outsiders on the 
board, and CEO/chairman duality 
𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖 = Dummy variable that identifies whether or not a firm was sued in a securities class action 
lawsuit (1=yes, 0=no)  
Following Bhagat et al. (2006), Boon et al. (2007), and Linck et al. (2008), we consider a set of 





5. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we first estimate a series of logit models to examine whether a firm’s litigation risk 
is affected by its corporate governance. We then examine whether firms improve their governance 
after the occurrence of a lawsuit. 
5.1 Logit Analyses 
Table 4 presents estimates from a logit model in which the dependent variable takes on a value 
of one if the firm is sued and zero if the firm is a matching non-sued firm. Models 1 through 8 differ 
with respect to the included independent variables and control variables. We start our analysis 
with a simple model that only includes the G-Index as an explanatory variable and all control 
variables in Model 1. Because we documented significant correlations between a firm’s board size 
and audit committee size as well as between the proportion of outside directors on the board and 
on the audit committee, we separate these variables in Models 2 and 3. Model 4 display the results 
for CEO stock ownership, institutional holdings, and changes in institutional holdings. Model 5 
considers CEO gender, age, and tenure. Model 6 and 7 include different components of executive 
compensation. Due to the fact that salary is significantly correlated with bonuses and options, we 
run the regression with each independent variable separately. In addition, Models 1-5 include a 
full set of control variables, while Model 6 and Model 7 exclude certain variables according to the 
correlation matrix.  
 
****************************Insert Table 4 about here **************************** 
In Model 1, a high governance index (indicating weak governance) increases the probability of a 
lawsuit. In addition, the percentage of independent outside directors on the board and the audit 
committee is negatively related to the incidence of a lawsuit, suggesting that an independent board 
and/or audit committee decreases a firm’s litigation risk.  In contrast, the signs of board size and 
audit committee size are negative, inconsistent with our expectation. Interestingly, the relation 
between CEO/chairman duality and the likelihood of litigation is positive in Model 2 and negative 
in Model 3, thus disallowing clear inferences. In Model 4, the institutional ownership variable is in 
line with our hypothesis, suggesting that the higher the proportion of institutional ownership, the 
less likely the firm is to be sued. The results in Model 5 imply that a lawsuit is more likely for firms 
with a female, old, and short-tenured CEO, partially contradicting our hypotheses. Nevertheless, 
17 
 
none of the coefficients mentioned are significant; we thereby cannot draw any conclusions at this 
point.  
Turning to the compensation components, we find that salary has strong explanatory power in 
predicting the probability of a lawsuit. In economic terms, a one-point increase in the proportion of 
salary increases the probability of a lawsuit by 3.85% at the 1% level of significance. This suggests 
that, consistent with our hypothesis, the lower the proportion of salary in the CEO’s total 
compensation, the more incentives the executives have to pursue risky business practices that 
may hurt shareholder wealth, thus triggering litigation. The bonus component, the option 
component, LTIPs, and restricted shares have no significant impact on lawsuit incidence, even if 
their signs are mostly consistent with our expectation. 
In Model 8, a positive statistically significant coefficient for the G-Index supports our hypothesis 
that firms with poor corporate governance are more likely to be sued. The coefficient is significant 
at the 5% level. Firms with a higher G-Index and fewer shareholder rights, are exposed to more 
litigation risk compared to those with a low index. The impact of CEO tenure on the probability of 
litigation is significantly negative at the 5% level. The relation suggests that CEOs with shorter 
tenure may be more innovative and riskier in their business practices, which could be harmful for 
shareholders. Moreover, shareholders may perceive that CEOs with shorter tenure nay be more 
tempted to maximize their own profits at the expense of shareholders, leading to a higher 
likelihood of shareholder litigation. LTIPs have a significant positive impact on litigation risk at the 
10% level, consistent with the hypothesis that when LTIPs account for a large proportion of a 
CEO’s compensation package, CEO may pursue in aggressive business strategies to achieve 
higher share prices and reap the benefits from LTIPs. 
In Model 9, we run a regression with all five compensation variables. We find that the proportion 
of bonuses is positively related to the incidence of litigation at the 10% level. The result contradicts 
our hypothesis, while it is in line with our univariate results that the proportion of bonuses is higher 
for sued firms than non-sued firms. 
The results concerning our control variables are in line with previous research findings. Turnover, 
the firm’s buy-and-hold return, leverage, size and the technology dummy are all significant at the 
1% level. Turnover, which is measured as the ratio of the firm’s average daily trading volume to 
the total number of shares outstanding for the fiscal year, is positively related to litigation 
probability in Model 1 to 9. This result is consistent with the previous literature on litigation risk: 
when a stock is heavily traded, there are more potential plaintiffs who transact at distorted prices. 
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The buy-and-hold return is shown to have a negative relation with the incidence of litigation, 
suggesting that large price drops trigger litigation. We find a positive association between firm size 
and lawsuit incidence. Larger firms are more likely to be the target of litigation, not necessarily 
because they are more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior, but because they have deeper 
pockets and may thus settle for more. We also find evidence that firms in the high technology 
industry are more likely to be sued, likely because the industry is more risky than others. The sign 
for leverage, however, is contrary to our expectation. Previous studies typically show that high 
debt may indicate a recent history of poor performance, asset write-downs or forced heavy 
borrowing, fueling shareholder dissatisfaction. Our result suggests that higher leverage tends to 
decrease the probability of being sued. According to Jensen (1986), free cash flow available to 
the managers may give rise to agency problems, while high debt can mitigate these problems by 
forcing managers to pay out free cash flows. As such, debt holders play an important role in 
monitoring the management, benefiting the shareholders. 
Volatility, intangible assets, the book-to-market ratio, the dividend ratio, litigation frequency, and 
analyst coverage are also significant at least at the10% level. Volatility, as a proxy for the risk of 
the firm’s stock, is significant with a positive coefficient of 30.5 in Model 7. This result indicates 
that high stock price volatility in stock price may result in shareholder litigation. Litigation risk 
increases when a firm has more intangible assets, suggesting that firms with more intangible 
assets are harder for outsiders to value and monitor, thus these firms are more likely to have 
greater agency problems. The book-to-market ratio is negatively significant in Model 1, 7 and 9, 
while positively significant in Model 8. Prior research provides explanations for both cases. 
Strahan (1998) argues that the book-to-market ratio may capture managerial success, therefore 
firms with a low book-to-market ratio may be better managed and less likely to be sued, while 
Jensen (2004) proposes that a low book-to-market ratio can be a sign of overvaluation, which may 
motivate management to manipulate share prices, thus causing litigation. Regarding the impact 
of dividends, we find a significant positive relation Model 6. Its sign implies that higher dividends 
increase the likelihood of litigation, conflicting with past studies. The positive sign may be indirectly 
driven by firm size, since larger firm tend to pay out more dividends. Indeed, dividends are 
insignificant where size is significant. Litigation frequency has a negative relation with litigation 
incidence at the 5% level of significance in Model 7 and at the 10% of significance in Model 9. 
Analyst coverage is positively related to litigation risk at the 5% significance level. This results may 
due to the fact that large firms are more likely to be sued. Mohan (2004) argues that analysts may 
not be able to pre-empt earnings manipulation by managers or play a role in reducing information 
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asymmetry between managers and shareholders. R&D expenditures and ROA are insignificant in 
all models. 
 
****************************Insert Table 5 about here **************************** 
 
Our results imply that firms operating in the high technology industry are more likely to be sued. 
To further examine the impact of industry effects, we follow Barabanov et al. (2013) and categorize 
firms into two subsamples depending on whether or not they are  technology (tech) focused. The 
results are reported in Table 5. The fraction of salary is negatively related to the probability of 
litigation at the 5% level, similar to the results in our main models. Other independent variables 
are not significant. Volatility, intangible assets, leverage, the book-to-market ratio and the dividend 
ratio also lose their significance in this sample. The coefficients for turnover, buy-and-hold return, 
size, and litigation frequency are largely in line with what we found in our main models, although 
their significance tends to be lower.  
In the non-tech sample, salary is negatively related to litigation at the 1% level of significance, and 
restricted share is positively related to litigation at the 10% of significance. Both variables are 
economically significant: the probability of a lawsuit increases by 3.3568 percent when the 
proportion of salary decreases by one percent, and increases by 2.654 when the proportion of 
restricted shares decreases by one percent. The signs and significance levels of turnover, buy 
and hold return, intangible assets, leverage, and size remain largely the same as in the main 
models. The book-to-market ratio and litigation frequency are strongly significant in Model 1, while 
they lose their significance afterwards.  
We are also interested in testing whether if there is a difference in how corporate governance 
affects litigation risk before and after the financial crisis in 2007. Table 6 provides the results for 
the corresponding subsamples. Because there are not enough observations to estimate Model 6 
to 9 for the post-crisis sample, we only report Models 1 to 5 here and compare the outcomes for 
the two subsamples. CEO age is the only significant independent variable in the pre-crisis sample. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that firms with older CEOs are more likely to be sued. Referring 
to Table 4, we find that even though the difference in CEO age between the sued and non-sued 
sample is significant at the 10% level, the magnitude is small: the average age is 55.1191 in the 
sued sample, and 56.3312 in the non-sued sample at the10% level, thus it is not difficult to make 
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sense of this relation. The results for turnover, buy-and-hold return, leverage, size, the book-to-
market ratio and analyst coverage are similar to what we found in previous models. 
 
**************************** Insert Table 6 about here **************************** 
After the crisis, none of our main variables of interest influence litigation risk, whereas turnover, 
leverage, and size continue to affect the probability of a lawsuit. Furthermore, the tech dummy is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that after the financial crisis tech firms are more likely to be 
sued, possibly because shareholders and investors are more sensitive to risk after 2008 and the 
industry is considered more risky.  
5.2 Changes in Corporate Governance 
Next, we perform a series of univariate tests to examine whether these sued firms implement any 
governance changes following a lawsuit. In Panel A of Table 7, we compare the G-Index and 
various board characteristics one year before the lawsuit and one year after the lawsuit for our full 
sample. We find no significant differences in the G-Index, the number of directors, and the 
CEO/chairman duality. We do, however, observe a significant difference in the proportion of 
outside directors. The mean proportion increases from 68.38% to 72.05%, and the median 
proportion increases from 72.73% to 75.00%, with the changes being statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
In Panel B of Table 7, we report changes in the G-Index and board characteristics from one year 
prior to the lawsuit to two years after the lawsuit. Neither the G-Index nor board size exhibit any 
significant changes. Both the average and median fraction of outside directors are significantly 
greater at the 1% level two years after the lawsuit. Furthermore, the difference in CEO/chairman 
duality is also significant at the 1% level. The average percentage declines from 54.82% to 
47.45%, and the median change from 1 to 0, suggesting that fewer CEOs hold the position of 
board chairman two years after the lawsuit. 
**************************** Insert Table 7 here**************************** 
We further conduct a multivariate analysis to examine whether or not the lawsuit that drives these 
improvements. To do so, we regress changes in board size and CEO/chairman duality on the 
sued dummy and several other explanatory factors. Table 8 reports the results for both 
regressions. In Panel A, the coefficient on the sued dummy is positive, but it is nether significant 
in Model 1 nor Model 2. The change in size is weakly significant in Model 2, implying that the 
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change in the number of outside directors is caused by a change in firm size. When examining 
CEO/chairman duality, it appears that it is the CEO’s age that drives the change. The change in 
the CEO’s age is positively related to the change in duality at the 5% level of significance, 
suggesting that who are more likely to serve in a dual CEO/chairman role as they get older. Thus, 
even though our univariate results provided some support for the notion that sued firms change 
their corporate governance practices following a lawsuit, our multivariate results suggest that it 
may be other factors that drive these changes.  
**************************** Insert Table 8 about here**************************** 
 
6. Limitations and Robustness Test 
 
Due to data availability limitations in the Risk Metrics database, we only consider S&P 1500 firms 
which tend to be larger. Because they have deeper pockets, larger firms may be more likely to be 
sued, thus skewing our sample. To address this issue, we also employed an alternative matching 
approach to create our non-sued sample. Specifically, we relax the industry matching criterion 
from 4-digit SIC codes to 3-digit SIC codes. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar 




We find evidence that the litigation risk for seasoned firms can be explained by corporate 
governance, CEO compensation as well as CEO tenure. Board variables including board size, 
board independence, audit committee size, audit committee independence and CEO/Chairman 
duality provide little ability to predict lawsuit activity. Although CEO age may still play a role in 
some circumstances, our findings suggest that this effect is sample specific. We find some 
evidence of board changes following shareholder lawsuits. Specifically, sued firms increase the 
proportion of outside board members one year after the lawsuit and keep increasing the proportion 
two years afterwards. In addition, sued firms dissolve the CEO-chairmanship link two years after 
the lawsuit, likely because it usually takes some time for a company to change its chairman. 
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Table 1: Seasoned Firms Litigation—Summary Statistics 
Our sued sample consists of 1,613 securities class action lawsuits that were 
filed against publicly traded, seasoned non-financial U.S. firms between 1996 
and 2012. We only consider firms for which all required data is available in 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (WRDS) and Compustat 
databases (last column). After these restrictions, our sample covers about 
half of the 3,562 lawsuits contained in Stanford Univsersity’s Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse database (middle column). 
   
Year 
Number of Lawsuits 
Listed on  Stanford s 
Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse  
Number of Lawsuits 
Against Non-Financial 
Seasoned Firms with 
Complete Data 
1996 110 33 
1997 174 62 
1998 242 84 
1999 209 94 
2000 216 104 
2001 498 314 
2002 265 116 
2003 228 108 
2004 239 118 
2005 182 76 
2006 120 53 
2007 177 60 
2008 223 66 
2009 165 54 
2010 175 81 
2011 188 106 
2012 151 84 
Total 3562 1613 
27 
 
Table 2:Comparative Statistics for Sued and Matched Non-sued Firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of 1,613 firms subject to a shareholder lawsuit 
between 1996 and 2012 and 1613 matching non-sued firms. Matched firms must not have been 
involved in any securities litigation during the sample period, must belong to the same industry as the 
sued firm, and must have the smallest Euclidean distance relative to the sued firm in terms of both firm 
size and book-to-market ratio. The G-Index is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index. Bsize is 
the number of directors on the board. Outside is the percentage of outside independent directors on 
the board. ACsize and ACoutside are defined similarly. Duality is a dummy variable coded as 1 when 
the CEO or president is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. Instown is the percentage of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders relative to the r total number of shares outstanding. 
ΔInstown is the change in institutional ownership from quarter T-4 to T. CEOown is the percentage of 
shares owned by CEO over total number of shares outstanding. Female is a dummy variable coded 
as 1 when the CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the CEO. Tenure represents the 
number of years the CEO served the firm. Salary (%) is the dollar value of the CEO’s base salary 
divided by his/her total compensation earned by CEO. Option (%) is the dollar value of option awards 
(FAS 123R) over total compensation. LTIP (%) is the dollar value of long term incentive programs over 
total compensation. Rshare (%) is the dollar value of restricted shares over total compensation. 
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year. Turnover is the 
average daily trading volume as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding for the fiscal year. 
Bhr is the holding period return during a period of 252 trading days before the date of filing. INTAN is 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s intangible assets. R&DEx are the research and design expenditures 
of the firm. ROA is earnings before interest divided by total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets. BM is the ratio of book equity to market 
capitalization of the firm. Dividend is the ratio of total dividend over earnings before interests and taxes. 
Frequency is the total number of lawsuits that took place during a one year period before the filing date. 
Female is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a company is in high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise. Analyst 
is measured as the total number of analyst forecasts for the firm one year before the lawsuit. 









 Sued-Firms Non-Sued Firms Equality Tests 






G-Index 5.911 6 1.935 5.426 5 1.861 <.0001 <.0001 
Bsize 9.012 9 2.986 7.677 7 3.760 <.0001 <.0001 
ACsize 3.247 3 1.494 2.978 3 1.641 <.0001 <.0001 
Boutside 0.690 0.727 0.195 0.632 0.667 0.226 <.0001 <.0001 
ACoutside 0.924 1 0.167 0.929 1 0.187 0.4458 0.0008 
Duality 0.533 1 0.499 0.382 0 0.486 <.0001 <.0001 
Instown 0.503 0.516 0.287 0.575 0.593 0.253 <.0001 <.0001 
ΔInstown -0.006 -0.001 0.109 -0.00019 0.004 0.073 0.1197 0.0092 
CEOown 0.032 0.009 0.071 0.044 0.022 0.071 0.0011 <.0001 
Female 0.049 0 0.145 0.036 0 0.155 0.031 <.0001 
Age 55.199 56 6.496 56.331 56 7.401 <.0001 0.0073 
Tenure 9.786 8 6.727 12.252 9.450 9.530 <.0001 <.0001 
Salary (%) 0.271 0.215 0.208 0.533 0.567 0.238 <.0001 <.0001 
Bonus (%) 0.145 0.109 0.146 0.125 0.079 0.125 0.0004 0.003 
Option (%) 0.507 0.526 0.294 0.305 0.309 0.224 <.0001 <.0001 
LTIP (%) 0.015 0 0.062 0.010 0 0.045 0.0374 0.0138 
Rshare (%) 0.062 0 0.072 0.028 0 0.032 <.0001 <.0001 
Volatility 0.053 0.05 0.029 0.046 0.040 0.024 <.0001 <.0001 
Turnover 16.317 11.748 23.120 6.700 4.605 7.022 <.0001 <.0001 
Bhr -0.276 -0.425 0.705 0.168 -0.010 0.932 <.0001 <.0001 
INTAN 18.520 18.587 2.705 17.350 17.256 1.900 <.0001 <.0001 
R&DEx 22.200 0 234.280 1.278 0 13.609 0.0011 <.0001 
ROA -0.048 0.049 0.467 -0.080 0.014 0.259 0.0067 <.0001 
Leverage 0.195 0.080 0.697 0.170 0.041 0.237 0.1547 <.0001 
Size 20.136 19.773 2.082 19.213 18.998 1.384 <.0001 <.0001 
BM 0.577 0.383 0.713 0.808 0.735 0.584 <.0001 <.0001 
Dividend 0.060 0 0.766 0.060 0 1.299 0.9973 0.129 
Tech 0.489 0 0.5 0.489 0 0.500 1 1 
Frequency 223.667 216 85.302 223.667 216 85.302 1 1 
Analysis 18.846 11 24.321 20.181 10 26.105 0.0417 0.0261 
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Table 3:Correlation Matrix 
This table reports correlation coefficients between all variables we use in our research. For exceptional covariance, we only report variable 
pairs whose correlation coefficients are larger than 0.5 here. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 Variable 2 4 11 13 14 15 18 19 22 23 
1 Gindex           
2 Bsize 1.00           
3 ACsize 0.81***          
4 Boutside -0.28* 1.00          
5 ACoutside -0.08  0.64***         
6 Duality 0.07  -0.04          
7 Instown 0.01  0.36**         
8 ΔInstown -0.06  0.24          
9 Female 0.25* 0.08          
10 Age -0.10  0.27*         
11 Tenure -0.20  -0.14  1.00         
12 CEOown -0.19  -0.19  0.59***        
13 Salary (%) 0.03  0.03  -0.20  1.00        
14 Bonus (%) -0.04  0.06  -0.10  0.60*** 1.00       
15 Option (%) 0.03  -0.08  -0.14  0.74*** 0.54*** 1.00      
16 LTIP (%) -0.05  0.19  0.05  -0.03  0.14  0.06      
17 Rshare (%) 0.04  0.19  -0.19  0.39*** 0.21  0.11      
18 Analysis -0.01  0.06  -0.09  0.70*** 0.45*** 0.80*** 1.00     
19 Volatility 0.21  -0.42*** -0.09  0.12  -0.21  0.08  -0.03  1.00    
20 Turnover -0.09  0.16  0.07  0.25* 0.43*** 0.15  0.26* -0.05    
30 
 
Continued. 2 4 11 13 14 15 18 19 22 23 
21 Bhr -0.10  0.21  -0.05  -0.09  0.08  -0.08  0.05  -0.24    
22 INTAN 0.01  0.02  -0.14  0.79*** 0.58*** 0.70*** 0.60*** -0.07  1.00   
23 ROA -0.21  0.22  -0.05  0.24  0.276* 0.12  0.03  -0.15  0.22  1.00  
24 Leverage 0.10  -0.08  -0.15  0.05  0.00  -0.05  -0.11  0.54*** 0.06  0.17  
25 Size 0.03  0.16  -0.23  0.85*** 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.01  0.71*** 0.43*** 
26 BM 0.03  0.08  0.16  -0.05  -0.07  -0.14  -0.10  -0.09  -0.08  -0.01  
27 Dividend -0.06  0.30** -0.13  -0.09  -0.17  -0.12  -0.18  0.00  -0.07  0.18  
28 Tech 0.28* -0.30** -0.06  -0.20  -0.22  -0.07  -0.02  0.04  -0.17  -0.55*** 
29 Frequency 0.36  -0.27* -0.23  0.39*** 0.10  0.52*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.22  -0.02  
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Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Governance 
This table presents results for a series of logit regressions in which we regress our litigation dummy variables (sued) against the firms’ corporate 
governance characteristics and various control variables. Our sued firm sample consists of 1,613 firms subject to a shareholder lawsuit between 
1996 and 2012. The non-sued sample consists of 1,613 firms that were matched with the sued firms on industry, size and book-to-market ratio. 
The dependent variable is dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the firm is subject to a shareholder lawsuit, and 0 otherwise. All other variables 
































 (4.6087) (5.8314) (6.0647) (9.4350) (7.3175) (0.7974) (5.0623) (224.5000) (9.2725) 
Gindex 0.0367       13.6524**  
 (0.0955)       (6.9516)  
Bsize  -0.0330        
  (0.0621)        
ACsize   -0.0915     -4.7529  
   (0.1771)     (3.9206)  
Boutside  -0.7523        
  (1.2928)        
ACoutside   -2.8893     68.7980  




















Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          
Duality  0.3509 -0.0101     -1.0614  
  (0.4774) (0.5069)     (18.8412)  
CEOown    5.4813      
    (4.1861)      
Instown    -0.3866    -32.1157  
    (2.2605)    (28.2946)  
ΔInstown    -0.6635    -46.6708  
    (5.2851)    (79.2374)  
Female     0.1888   42.9864  
     (1.3280)   (102.3000)  
Age     0.0476   6.0406  
     (0.0377)   (3.6962)  
Tenure     -0.0150   -11.6957**  
     (0.0301)   (5.7746)  
Salary(%)      -3.8513***  -38.2696  
      (1.0042)  (32.5409)  
Bonus(%)       0.1875  5.0497* 
       (1.8748)  (2.8663) 




















Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Option(%)       1.4969  1.8931 
       (1.1248)  (1.7997) 
LTIP(%)      1.2131 -1.5286 308.9000* -1.7119 
      (3.2915) (4.0493) (168.0000) (6.6630) 
Rshare(%)      1.9984 1.1496 25.8892 6.2985 
      (1.2684) (1.8469) (39.0041) (3.9894) 
Volatility 9.1519 17.5409 10.6349 1.4872 16.6540 7.2306 30.5040* 1157.0000 32.0675 
 (13.4150) (18.1668) (19.4972) (28.9154) (17.8489) (12.8720) (16.8661) (762.9000) (24.9394) 
Turnover 0.1132*** 0.1263*** 0.1316*** 0.0999* 0.1397*** 0.1491*** 0.1466*** 2.1964* 0.1131* 
 (0.0279) (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0569) (0.0366) (0.0312) (0.0342) (1.2928) (0.0647) 
Bhr -0.3940 -0.6153 -0.5780 -0.2517 -0.5638 -1.1000*** -1.0272*** -20.6611 -3.8447*** 
 (0.2996) (0.3980) (0.4017) (0.6354) (0.4217) (0.3101) (0.2897) (14.1277) (1.1187) 
INTAN 0.1239 0.3540** 0.3752** 0.5353* 0.4287**    -0.3944 
 (0.1421) (0.1681) (0.1688) (0.3006) (0.1825)    (0.3600) 
R&DEx 1.1973 0.6483 0.5036 0.5902 0.2389 0.2045 0.0754   
 (0.7982) (0.9976) (1.0158) (5.4691) (0.8173) (0.2367) (0.2296)   
ROA -0.0872 -0.8661 -0.2947 -0.5301 -1.6311 0.0964 -1.4112 3.9597 -1.9393 
 (1.5591) (1.8616) (1.8885) (3.9214) (2.0063) (0.7604) (0.8745) (113.9000) (2.6485) 
Leverage -4.1165*** -6.3191*** -5.5843*** -6.7594*** -7.3651*** 1.6662 -3.9178** -22.1936 -5.6635** 




















Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Size 1.3557*** 1.4537*** 1.3951*** 1.2441** 1.5755***  1.4413***  1.8952*** 
 (0.2781) (0.3278) (0.3290) (0.4876) (0.3502)  (0.2637)  (0.6759) 
BM -0.8489** -0.6349 -0.5262 0.3836 -0.1380 -0.2301 -0.6006* 54.3433* -0.7204* 
 (0.4192) (0.5407) (0.5585) (0.6635) (0.5504) (0.3012) (0.3434) (28.1735) (0.3907) 
Dividend 0.1607 0.2724 0.3759 0.3221 0.2054 2.6074** 1.3389 148.7000 2.2226 
 (0.4308) (0.6984) (0.8167) (0.9316) (0.5718) (1.2563) (1.7945) (99.6764) (2.7338) 
Tech 1.5281*** 1.2610** 1.3047** 0.6734 1.2452** -0.1760 0.5956 86.1864 0.2500 
 (0.4602) (0.5783) (0.5960) (1.2088) (0.6050) (0.4106) (0.5385) (58.6071) (0.8324) 
Frequency 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0020 0.0018 0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0057** -0.1154 -0.0068* 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0720) (0.0036) 
Analysis -0.0051 -0.0014 0.0050 0.0481 0.0032    0.0379** 
 (0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0406) (0.0133)    (0.0180) 
N 366 293 278 103 281 261 261 46 144 
Chi-Square 266.4023 234.123 221.2819 69.9975 233.2026 147.7702 201.2655 62.2886 121.068 







Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of the Tech vs. Non-Tech Sub Sample 
This table presents results for a series of multivariate logit regressions for both a tech and non-tech sub-sample of our dataset. Panel 
A presents results for tech firms. Panel B reports results for non-tech firms. Our dependent variable describe here is dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the firm is subject to a shareholder lawsuit, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors 
are listed in parenthesis. The 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Tech Firms 














Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept -15.2985 -69.9309* -20.7289 -820.3000 -9.3572 1.9212 -23.9021** 
 (10.5684) (39.4454) (21.1587) (10146.7000) (18.2303) (2.5641) (11.1900) 
Gindex -0.0870       
 (0.2809)       
Bsize  0.1695      
  (0.1564)      
ACsize   -0.1297     
   (1.6274)     
Boutside  17.7246      
  (12.2296)      
ACoutside   -10.7820     
   (10.3660)     
Duality  -3.1810 -4.7861**     
  (2.1994) (2.4174)     
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CEOown    704.9000    
    (7309.8000)    
Instown    21.7726    
    (353.5000)    
ΔInstown    8.3782    
    (1840.1000)    
Female     -7.8493   
     (7.3030)   
Age     -0.0620   
     (0.1389)   
Tenure     -0.1665   
     (0.1194)   
Salary(%)      -6.1948**  
      (3.0691)  
Bonus(%)       -1.5700 
       (5.1379) 
Option(%)       1.7757 
       (2.8013) 
LTIP(%)      13.1211 0.2621 
      (15.3430) (19.4068) 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rshare(%)      -1.5660 0.9385 
      (3.7415) (4.6769) 
Volatility -8.9910 70.0895 -33.6564 767.5000 -103.1000 -17.3167 26.8295 
 (37.2388) (84.4435) (67.5861) (10042.5000) (96.8067) (27.6676) (39.3545) 
Turnover 0.2325** 0.3712 0.2440* -6.8433 0.6083* 0.2547*** 0.1849** 
 (0.1016) (0.2658) (0.1446) (101.3000) (0.3111) (0.0935) (0.0897) 
Bhr -1.7309* -4.2545** -3.2200* 20.9269 -5.9683* -0.7938** -0.7328* 
 (0.9146) (1.9992) (1.9243) (299.5000) (3.5053) (0.3698) (0.3803) 
INTAN 0.7039 -0.1951 0.3264 17.2325 -0.1594   
 (0.5426) (1.1109) (0.7227) (262.5000) (0.6740)   
R&DEx 0.1209 0.0500 0.2454 1.6419 0.1511 0.1207 0.0984 
 (0.9846) (0.7287) (0.5882) (25.7465) (1.3585) (0.1836) (0.1641) 
ROA 4.6858 14.4970 8.8876 -69.4512 9.6750 -0.9067 -1.6788 
 (4.6400) (12.3942) (9.8444) (1372.6000) (10.6543) (1.1451) (1.4797) 
Leverage 1.2125 9.0698 9.3233 -140.0000 17.5796 3.2382 -0.5350 
 (3.7008) (6.8460) (7.8901) (1840.8000) (12.2006) (2.6883) (3.8018) 
Size 0.2043 2.6810 1.4173 26.5794 0.8041  1.2562** 
 (0.8709) (2.3539) (1.2662) (348.2000) (1.1959)  (0.6327) 
BM -0.7807 1.4238 0.0447 2.0151 3.8594 -0.2321 -1.0910 
 (1.1592) (2.4279) (1.6323) (218.0000) (2.8979) (0.9066) (1.1570) 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dividend 1.2309 12.9030 2.9678 -493.1000 10.6191 5.6102 6.8971 
 (5.1019) (27.3906) (16.0113) (7492.6000) (23.4600) (4.7994) (5.3258) 
Frequency -0.0116* -0.0127 -0.0245 -0.0206 -0.0228* -0.0088 -0.0162** 
 (0.0066) (0.0123) (0.0154) (0.4980) (0.0125) (0.0054) (0.0080) 
Analysis 0.0195 0.0329 0.0397 0.0711 0.0044   
 (0.0203) (0.0257) (0.0299) (4.4968) (0.0199)   
N 130 105 99 16 101 99 99 
Chi-Square 135.2069 123.1713 113.3182 22.1775 116.2418 86.495 93.2577 





Panel B: Non-tech Firms 














Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept -31.6463*** -37.9507*** -34.7277*** -31.7603*** -46.9466*** -0.0121 -36.9213*** 
 (5.4430) (6.8639) (6.9815) (9.6844) (8.9673) (0.9437) (7.1235) 
Gindex 0.0380       
 (0.1119)       
Bsize  -0.0546      
  (0.1059)      
ACsize   -0.1018     
   (0.2101)     
Boutside  -1.4864      
  (1.4402)      
ACoutside   -2.9233     
   (2.1200)     
Duality  0.5551 0.2850     
  (0.5382) (0.5588)     
CEOown    4.8697    
    (4.2264)    
Instown    -1.6402    
    (2.4041)    
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ΔInstown    -0.2234    
    (5.3086)    
Female     0.5306   
     (1.4508)   
Age     0.0410   
     (0.0444)   
Tenure     0.0000   
     (0.0351)   
Salary(%)      -3.3568***  
      (1.2575)  
Bonus(%)       -0.3348 
       (2.4066) 
Option(%)       0.6068 
       (1.6294) 
LTIP(%)      0.6435 -2.7993 
      (3.4567) (4.6079) 
Rshare(%)      2.6540* 0.4864 
      (1.4924) (2.4686) 
Volatility 17.9070 18.2473 14.9011 -0.1221 10.9523 4.2693 13.7239 
 (15.0109) (20.2439) (21.4741) (29.1641) (20.3773) (17.4768) (22.3117) 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Turnover 0.0953*** 0.1196*** 0.1190*** 0.1068* 0.1380*** 0.1243*** 0.1850*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0404) (0.0396) (0.0581) (0.0439) (0.0364) (0.0522) 
Bhr -0.2432 -0.5825 -0.5095 -0.1081 -0.5369 -1.5755*** -2.1203*** 
 (0.3312) (0.4449) (0.4446) (0.6499) (0.4829) (0.4254) (0.5005) 
INTAN 0.0526 0.3581* 0.3551* 0.5847* 0.4538**   
 (0.1561) (0.1935) (0.1944) (0.3107) (0.2162)   
R&DEx 0.8578 0.1236 0.0386 0.3574 0.0346 0.2800 -0.0021 
 (2.3855) (3.1821) (3.2032) (4.6135) (2.7400) (0.3995) (0.1219) 
ROA -1.4698 -0.9211 -0.1615 -2.3775 -2.4042 -0.1073 -2.4881 
 (1.6456) (1.9790) (2.1294) (4.4583) (2.1027) (1.4782) (1.7249) 
Leverage -4.2973*** -7.1837*** -6.5660*** -7.1863*** -8.3055*** 1.1115 -6.4170*** 
 (1.3693) (1.7954) (1.8486) (2.7264) (1.9986) (1.3054) (2.1558) 
Size 1.4401*** 1.5707*** 1.4924*** 1.0101** 1.7184***  1.7916*** 
 (0.3174) (0.3742) (0.3668) (0.5075) (0.4001)  (0.3694) 
BM -0.9062** -0.7628 -0.6002 0.3236 -0.1918 -0.2200 -0.4813 
 (0.4551) (0.6422) (0.6617) (0.6734) (0.6460) (0.3250) (0.3466) 
Dividend 0.1159 0.2486 0.2853 0.2953 0.0816 2.2296 1.0441 
 (0.3400) (0.7361) (0.8237) (0.6602) (0.4480) (1.3762) (2.0100) 
Frequency 0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0023 0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0023 
 (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0029) 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Analysis -0.0062 -0.0013 0.0110 0.0576 -0.0024   
 (0.0155) (0.0196) (0.0212) (0.0459) (0.0206)   
N 236 188 179 87 180 162 162 
Chi-Square 143.6223 128.3705 121.3539 52.7929 131.8377 73.975 121.9859 
P-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of the Pre- vs. Post-Crisis Sub Sample 
This table presents results for a series of multivariate logit regressions for both pre- vs. post-crisis 
sub-sample of our dataset. The pre-crisis sub-sample includes all lawsuits filed before 2008. The 
post-crisis sample includes all lawsuits filed in and after 2008. Our dependent variable is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if the firm is subject to a shareholder lawsuit, and 0 otherwise. Our dependent 
variable describe here is dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is subject to a shareholder lawsuit, 
and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are listed in 
parenthesis. The 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis Period 










Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -29.6417*** -45.7417*** -42.9378*** -532.2000 -56.0030*** 
 (6.3180) (11.0387) (11.2197) (700.0000) (13.9168) 
Gindex 0.0757     
 (0.1189)     
Bsize  0.0616    
  (0.0674)    
ACsize   0.2266   
   (0.3591)   
Boutside  -0.4743    
  (2.0430)    
ACoutside   -4.7560   
   (3.1007)   
Duality  -0.5679 -0.9833   
  (0.8283) (0.8540)   
CEOown    100.1000  
    (150.0000)  
Instown    55.8254  
    (50.3551)  
ΔInstown    -200.3000  
    (129.4000)  
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Female     2.0681 
     (1.9729) 
Age     0.1385* 
     (0.0787) 
Tenure     -0.0486 
     (0.0677) 
Volatility 19.9322 47.3191 21.8543 437.3000 42.2626 
 (16.9563) (29.0725) (35.6878) (1884.2000) (30.2432) 
Turnover 0.0864** 0.1406** 0.1702** 2.9888 0.1361** 
 (0.0412) (0.0642) (0.0695) (2.8805) (0.0621) 
Bhr -0.8543* -2.1680** -2.6578** -29.6879 -2.3433** 
 (0.4844) (0.8590) (1.0590) (29.0200) (0.9380) 
INTAN 0.1519 0.4757 0.5539* 15.3459 0.5208* 
 (0.1934) (0.2969) (0.2981) (14.1239) (0.2933) 
R&DEx 0.5308 0.0917 0.1275 -1.2765 0.0833 
 (0.8334) (0.6057) (1.3125) (3.6202) (0.6101) 
ROA 0.8998 0.5080 1.5857 -149.7000 -1.7580 
 (1.8798) (3.3293) (3.7029) (223.8000) (3.7897) 
Leverage -5.4039*** -11.8854*** -11.3461*** -155.2000 -12.5659*** 
 (1.6434) (3.1559) (3.3852) (126.1000) (3.3353) 
Size 1.3084*** 1.7622*** 1.7404*** 9.6217 1.8596*** 
 (0.3819) (0.5775) (0.5723) (30.0984) (0.5822) 
BM -0.7103* 0.6686 0.9339 24.6754 0.9791 
 (0.4067) (0.6815) (0.7829) (31.7694) (0.6704) 
Dividend -1.8664 1.6704 1.8961 72.5483 1.3766 
 (3.0779) (2.6557) (2.6910) (575.2000) (2.2917) 
Tech 1.2567* -0.9603 -1.3241 -2.7765 -0.6200 
 (0.6596) (1.2450) (1.3448) (23.2364) (1.2216) 















Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Frequency -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0646 -0.0021 
 (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.1090) (0.0036) 
Analysis 0.0051 0.0360* 0.0572** 1.0047 0.0339* 
 (0.0139) (0.0203) (0.0280) (1.2399) (0.0197) 
N 194 131 116 49 129 
Chi-Square 135.8663 115.0795 102.9197 67.2149 117.4936 
P-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 7: Univariate Comparison of Corporate Governance Characteristics Before and 
After a Lawsuit 
This table compares corporate governance characteristics before and after the lawsuit filing. 
Panel A presents changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to one year after the lawsuit. Panel 
B presents changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to two years after the lawsuit. All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. Significance levels are computed for the difference in mean 
(medians) using a t-test and a Wilcoxon t -test. 
Panel A 
















Gindex 677 5.854 6.000 1.913 582 5.857 6.000 1.819 0.9807 0.9388 
Bsize 522 8.815 9.000 3.249 591 8.780 9.000 3.028 0.8502 0.8806 
Boutside 522 0.684 0.727 0.212 591 0.720 0.750 0.195 0.0027 0.0020 
Duality 523 0.549 1.000 0.498 591 0.519 1.000 0.500 0.3175 0.3172 
           
Panel B           
















Gindex 677 5.854 6.000 1.913 582 5.859 6.000 1.754 0.9527 0.8497 
Bsize 522 8.815 9.000 3.249 591 8.900 9.000 2.883 0.6377 0.4936 
Boutside 522 0.684 0.727 0.212 591 0.736 0.778 0.188 <.0001 <.0001 






Table 8: Multivariate Analysis of Governance Changes 
This table presents results for a series of multivariate OLS regressions. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is the change in the proportion of outside members on the board. In Panel 
B, the dependent variable is the change in CEO/Chairman duality. Model 1 considers changes 
from one year prior to the lawsuit to one year after the lawsuit. Model 2 considers changes from 
one year prior to the lawsuit to two years after the lawsuit. Sued is a dummy variable coded as 
1 if the firm is subject to a shareholder lawsuit, and 0 otherwise. Free cash flow (FCF) is 
calculated as net operating cash flow minus dividends paid divided by total assets. All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. The 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Changes in the proportion of outside members on the board 
Model Model 1  Model 2  
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
     
Intercept -0.0048 0.0198 0.0481 0.0256 
Sued 0.0344 0.0278 0.0209 0.0319 
Volatility 0.3873 0.9032 1.0743 1.1389 
ΔINTAN 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ΔROA 0.1276 0.1545 0.0397 0.1904 
ΔLeverage 0.1120 0.1298 0.0411 0.1644 
ΔSize 0.0524 0.0344 0.0588* 0.0331 
ΔBM -0.0325 0.0228 0.0100 0.0388 
ΔFCF -0.2145 0.1372 -0.1343 0.1890 
ΔBsize 0.0146 0.0104 0.0089 0.0087 
N 132  88  
R-Square 0.0908  0.0731  
Pr > F 0.2167  0.722  
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Panel B: Changes in CEO/Chairman Duality 
Model Model 1  Model 2  
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept -0.0513 0.0427 -0.1733 0.0592 
Sued -0.0243 0.0600 0.0244 0.0783 
ΔAge 0.0125** 0.0059 0.0146** 0.0067 
ΔTenure -0.0036 0.0059 0.0039 0.0074 
N 128  85  
R-Square 0.0374  0.0944  
Pr > F 0.1914  0.0444  
 
 
 
  
